

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 1

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL  
5 March 1982

## In From the Cold

# Long Out of Fashion, Spy Agencies Now Get Priority in Washington

## Administration Adds Agents And Analysts, Pays Heed To Once-Ignored Nations

## But Is It Politicizing CIA?

By GERALD F. SEIB

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

WASHINGTON—Radio listeners in Atlanta may have been startled recently to hear a mellifluous voice saying, "We're the Central Intelligence Agency, looking for very special people to train for a career with us."

The announcer explained that if listeners could "make on-the-spot decisions, have initiative and self-reliance, are willing to live abroad," they could qualify for a job. The ad closed with these instructions: "Get in touch if you believe you are special enough for a career with the Central Intelligence Agency."

That ad and a similar one run in Salt Lake City represent the CIA's first effort to recruit new employees with broadcast advertising. And the Atlanta experiment, in particular, was a big hit. "It absolutely swamped us with responses," a CIA official says.

The commercials are just one sign that the Reagan administration has begun trying to make good on its promise to rebuild America's intelligence system. Both in radio and newspaper ads, the CIA is recruiting full-time analysts for duty either at its headquarters near here or at posts abroad. Overall, the administration has begun quietly increasing the intelligence system's secret budget by roughly the same rate as the Pentagon's 18% rise for fiscal 1983. Meanwhile, the CIA is assembling a five-year master plan for beefing up the intelligence community, which many in Congress now agree was worn thin by staffing and budget restraints during the 1960s and 1970s.

## Emphasis on People

The Reagan administration's plans will make some broad changes in the way the U.S. intelligence system does its work in the 1980s. The emphasis will be on adding analysts and clandestine agents, after the recent heavy dependence on spy gadgetry for budgetary reasons. Many of the new people will be used to build up the CIA's knowledge about developing countries that promise to be the world hot spots in the 1980s. "If there is a broad, general underlying approach, it says you have to devote a lot of time and attention to understanding in depth countries that haven't been centers of attention in the 1970s," a senior U.S. intelligence official says.

At this point Congress and the public seem willing to support the administration's plans. But some lawmakers sound a warning. They say the new congressional consensus for rebuilding intelligence could be threatened by what some consider another trend: the Reagan administration's inclination to "politicize" the intelligence community to fit its policies.

Some lawmakers think politics, rather than a desire for objective intelligence, lies behind the appointment of some intelligence officials. And they charge that some recent CIA work has been tailored to fit administration views. Democratic Sen. Paul Tsongas of Massachusetts recently stormed out of a closed-door briefing on Central America, charging that the session had turned into a political harangue rather than a presentation of intelligence information.

The meeting was given by Constantine Menges, a conservative Latin American expert hired by the Reagan administration as the CIA's national intelligence officer for Latin America. Afterward, Sen. Tsongas and two other Democratic Senators sent a letter to CIA Director William Casey complaining that the meeting "bordered on policy prescription rather than a straightforward analysis of available intelligence data."

Some Senators suspected that the CIA's analyses of the administration's proposal to sell Awacs radar planes to Saudi Arabia were shaded to push the sale. Likewise, they objected when Mr. Casey ordered CIA analysts to rewrite a report on terrorism to include more emphasis on the Soviet role in international terrorism.

"It goes back to the whole question of whether we're going to have an agency giving what we need—unvarnished, unencumbered, straight facts," says Democratic Sen. Joseph Biden of Delaware, a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee.

## Cons

For  
tion's  
around  
comm  
the  
heav  
Lang  
the  
agenc  
but a  
lesser  
Bo  
intell  
top in  
of pe

a long and steady decline in 1967. By the mid-1970s, he says, almost one-third of the personnel devoted to intelligence in the 1960s had been lopped off.

Ray Cline, a former high CIA official, adds that from 1970 to 1974 U.S. spending on intelligence increased little if any. As a result, he says, inflation cut the real investment in intelligence by 33% to 50%.

Some of the reduction resulted from the end of the Vietnam war, which had required an intelligence buildup. But other factors were at work, too. Revelations of abuses by the CIA undercut congressional support for intelligence spending. Also, the intelligence agencies were hurt by the government-wide slashing of overseas personnel in the early 1970s in an attempt to stem the flow of dollars out of the U.S.

Both Democrats and Republicans now find large gaps in the nation's intelligence capabilities. "The U.S. intelligence system isn't able to deal with multiple crises, as we have experienced recently, without diverting resources from other high-priority missions," the Senate Intelligence Committee said in a recent report. "Moreover, in many areas of the Third World, coverage by the U.S. intelligence system is either marginal or nonexistent."

The CIA has suffered a "brain drain" of top analysts, Sen. Biden says. Its language abilities have declined; during the upheaval in Iran, a community-wide search turned up only two Farsi-speaking employees who could be put to work analyzing events there, a former official says. And because few new agents have been joining up, some two-thirds of the higher-ups in the CIA's clandestine services are technically eligible for retirement because they are more than 50 years old.

One area in which the U.S. intelligence system remains unparalleled is in spy technology. For example, the U.S. has satellites with cameras that can spot cars and trucks moving down roads; and it has spy planes with cameras that can easily distinguish objects less than a yard in diameter.

Under the Reagan administration's plans, this electronic wizardry will be developed further. But the initial emphasis will be elsewhere. "The intelligence program is trying to wean itself off the pattern of heavy investment in technical resources and deni-  
ans," one